



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE INSTRUCTION

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FOR DC USE ONLY

NO.: CA- 2391 Sept. 12, 1959

COPY NO. 1

SUBJECT: Berlin Contingency Planning - Air Access - "Task One"

TO: American Embassy, Bonn

RPTD INFO: Berlin, Paris (For USCINCEUR, Thurston and Finn)

- REFERENCES:
- A. Berlin's telegram 268 to Born (315 to Department) Nov. 11, 1958
  - B. Tripartite paper, "Berlin Contingency Planning", April 4, 1959
  - C. Bonn's despatch 1742, May 21, 1959 - 962.72
  - D. Telegram 2699 from Bonn, June 1, 1959
  - E. Airgram G-8 to Bonn, July 7, 1959
  - F. USCINCEUR's telegram EC 9-3715, July 11, 1959
  - G. Berlin's airgram G-17 to Bonn and Department, July 16, 1959
  - H. Airgram G-33 from Bonn, July 18, 1959
  - I. Telegram 194 to Bonn, July 22, 1959
  - J. Telegram 186 from Bonn, July 24, 1959
  - K. Airgram G-71 from Bonn, August 15, 1959

The Department has been concerned at the delay in developing planning, as required by paragraph 12 b (1) of reference B, to deal with a possible Soviet withdrawal from the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC). To expedite this planning, the Department prepared the enclosed draft, which attempts to reconcile as far as possible the various approaches to the problem made in the communications referred to above. The Department proposes to give copies of this draft to the British and French Embassies here as a basis for tripartite discussions. In doing so, the Department will make it clear that the draft is a working paper which does not yet have Government approval and which may have to be changed in the light of further study by interested U. S. agencies.

The Department would appreciate any comments which the Embassy or other addressees may wish to make on the paper.

With respect to the substance of the paper, the Embassy will note that:

The "Operational reaction" section of the paper (paragraph 1 through 4) is based on reference A, which has already been tripartitely approved as stand-by planning.

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(Security Classification) SEP 12 1959 A.M.

S/S-GR

Provision

DRAFTED BY:

EUR:GER:GPA:TDK:Kierney:caw

9-4-59

APPROVED BY:

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CLEARANCES:

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AV - Mr. van Oss

Defense - Col. Tyler (in draft)

S/S-Mr. McElhiney

S/S-Mr. McElhiney

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Provision is made for the communication of flight information to the East Germans as long as this can be done in a manner generally consistent with Allied rights of access and Allied policy towards the East German regime (GDR) but that such communication would be discontinued, even at the risk of suspension of civil air services, if it could not be done in a politically acceptable manner. We are reluctant to accept the idea of communicating flight information to the East Germans in any manner (except radio broadcasting) for we believe such communication necessarily implies that the East Germans have an interest in the corridors or that we are expecting them to make use of the corridors. There is obviously some inconsistency between a refusal to admit an East German Controller into BASC and giving the East Germans an indirect role in BASC operations through the communication of flight information. However, in view of the Embassy's belief (references J, H, and K) that the civil air carriers would not be likely to continue flying if flight plans were not passed to the East Germans and acknowledged or at least accepted, we believe we must make an attempt to find a tolerable basis for communicating flight information before resigning ourselves to a "civil airlift".

It is believed that the Embassy will find the remainder of the paper self-explanatory in the light of previous discussions.

The Department of Defense concurs in this instruction.

Enclosure:

DILLON, Acting

Berlin Contingency Planning.

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BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNINGAir Access - Possible Soviet Withdrawal from Berlin Air Safety Center

The following recommendations for planning to deal with a possible Soviet withdrawal from the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC) have been prepared in compliance with paragraph 12 b (1) of tripartite paper "Berlin Contingency Planning" dated April 4, 1959.

"Operational Reaction" to Soviet Withdrawal

1. If the Soviet Controller announces that the Soviets are withdrawing from BASC, the U. S. (British, French) Controllers will immediately make the following statement in reply:

"Flight information will continue to be made available to you at BASC in the normal manner. I am instructed to inform you that U. S. (British, French) aircraft will continue to fly in the Berlin corridors and control zone in the normal manner. My Government will hold your Government responsible for avoiding any interference with the safety of these aircraft while they are in the corridors and in the control zone."

2. If the Soviet Controller fails to appear, the statement in paragraph 1 above will be made immediately to the Soviet headquarters in Berlin-Karlshorst. If the Soviets have also withdrawn from Karlshorst, the message will be passed via the U. S. Mission (British and French Military Governments) to the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin or via the Military Liaison Mission to the Headquarters of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

3. If the Soviet Controller attempts to introduce an East German into BASC, either to handle civilian flight plans or to take over Soviet functions entirely, the U. S. (British, French) Controller will immediately inform the Soviet Controller that the presence of an East German official in BASC is not acceptable and request the Soviet Controller to see that the East German leaves BASC at once. If the East German does not leave immediately, the U. S. Controller will summon the U. S. military guards in the building and have them escort the East German from the building. The Western Controllers will tell the Soviet Controller "I am instructed to inform you that my Government holds your Government responsible for avoiding any interference with the safety of U. S. (British, French) aircraft in the Berlin corridors Control Zone, and flight information will continue to be made available to you in the normal manner."

4. If an East German official appears at BASC instead of a Soviet officer, he will be asked to leave and, if need be, escorted out. The statement in paragraph 1 above will then be made to the Soviet headquarters at Karlshorst or, if necessary, to the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin or the Headquarters of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

Tripartite

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Tripartite Air Safety Measures

5. Any change in the situation in BASC will immediately be brought to the attention of the carriers serving Berlin by the Embassies at Bonn. The Embassies will at the same time attempt to advise the carriers what effect the Soviet action seen in the light of the general situation obtaining at the time, may have on safety of flight in the Berlin corridors and control zone. In the absence of other indications of Soviet intentions, there should be no reason for the Embassies to presume from a mere Soviet withdrawal from BASC, unaccompanied by direct or implied threats, that there is a danger of physical interference with Allied aircraft.

6. BASC operations will be continued on a tripartite basis.

7. The Three Powers will assure that communications and navigational aids under their control are maintained in a manner which will assure the greatest safety of flight possible under the circumstances.

Communication of Flight Information

8. The Western Controllers will continue to pass flight plans to the Soviet desk in BASC, with a date-time stamp indicating the time of transmission, despite the absence of the Soviet Controller.

9. Flight information will be broadcast by radio on a fixed wave length in order to assure that both the Soviets and the East Germans have been put on notice regarding Allied flights.

10. Initially, an attempt will be made to communicate flight information by the most expeditious means, e.g., telephone or teletype, from BASC to the East German air traffic control authority at Schoenefeld. However, there will be no negotiations with GDR agencies to establish arrangements for this purpose and the form of communication will be so worded as to avoid any connotation of recognition of the GDR or of acceptance of an East German right to participate in air traffic control in the corridors and control zone. If receipt of the information at Schoenefeld is acknowledged expressly or tacitly, the practice will be continued.

11. If the air traffic control authority at Schoenefeld, after expressly or tacitly accepting Western flight plans, communicates to BASC flight information for an East German or other non-Allied flight in the Berlin corridors or control zone, BASC will reply by accepting the flight plan, if it does not conflict with an Allied flight, or by offering a different altitude if there is a conflict.

12. If

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12. If the air traffic control authority at Schoenefeld replies with a statement purporting to deny clearance for overflight of the GDR or to refuse a "guarantee of flight safety", BASC will send a further communication stating that flight plans are being communicated for information only and that the flight will take place or has taken place as scheduled.

13. If the East German regime attempts to exploit the Three Powers' communication of flight safety information to force the Three Powers into negotiations or undesirable contact with agencies of the GDR, the Three Powers will:

a. Communicate no further flight information to Schoenefeld;

b. Make a statement reiterating their rights and saying that they will in the future be forced to act on the assumption that the Soviets and East Germans will maintain absolute separation of their aircraft on the basis of the flight information broadcast by radio;

c. Unilaterally take whatever measures may be appropriate with a view to assuring the continuation of Berlin services by the civil carriers or be prepared, if necessary, to mount a "civil airlift" (i.e., substitute military for civil aircraft); and

d. Consider whether they wish to reserve certain altitudes in the corridors for non-Allied flights (cf. para. 17 b, below).

14. If replies from Schoenefeld indicate a consistent pattern of denial of "clearance to overfly the GDR" or denial of "guarantee of flight safety", the Three Powers will take the same steps mentioned in paragraph 13 above.

#### Detailed Implementation

15. Details of the implementation of this paper will be worked out as needed by the Three Embassies at Bonn, in consultation with "LIVE OAK" and other military headquarters as appropriate.

#### Public Statement

16. The public statement provided for in paragraph 3 of the April 4, 1959 paper will explain the procedures which the Three Powers intend to follow with respect to air access as well as surface access.

#### Relation of This Planning to Negotiations on Berlin

17. The above planning is based on the assumption that it will not be possible to negotiate with the Soviets a satisfactory modus vivendi for Berlin. Should negotiations on Berlin be resumed, the following possible approaches to the problem might be considered:

a. The

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a. The acceptance of an East German Controller in BASC as a Soviet agent (this would be comparable to the acceptance of East German highway and railroad checkpoint personnel as Soviet agents).

b. The reservation of fixed altitudes in the Berlin corridors for non-Allied aircraft, on the understanding that the remaining altitudes would be used exclusively by Allied aircraft.

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September 10, 1959

M - Mr. Donhauser

Air Access to Berlin

In connection with the attached instruction for Mr. Murphy's approval, Mr. McKiernan does not believe that the Under Secretary will need to consult the references indicated. If he should wish to do so, however, Mr. McKiernan said the relevant papers could be found in Mr. Murphy's Berlin Contingency Planning book.

John A. Calhoun

J. Carstairs